Motivated by the influenza vaccine industry, we study a supply chain contracting problem under the presence of uncertainties that are related to product design, delivery, and demand, respectively. The supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer places an order before the flu season starts and the manufacturer decides on when to produce the products. Because production after the design freeze can result in late deliveries and hence lost sales, the manufacturer may initiate production prior to the design freeze at its own risk. We show that a negative feedback loop in the firms' incentives may arise in this supply chain; as a result, some of the traditional coordinating contracts (e.g., revenue sharing) could perform even worse than a wholesale price contract. To break the negative feedback loop, we introduce two coordinating contracts: Delivery-time-dependent Quantity Flexibility (D-QF) contract that relates return quantity to delivery schedule, and Buyback-and-Late-Rebate (BLR) contract that combines buyback with rebate for late deliveries. In view of the complexity of the coordinating contracts, we also analyze two simpler formats, Quantity Flexibility (QF) and Late-Rebate (LR). We find that the QF contract performs well when profit margin is either very high or very low, while the LR contract performs well when the retailer has a dominant bargaining power.
Introduction
Behind many conventional products are myriad unconventional business challenges. When reflecting on the vaccine industry, James Matthews of Sanofi Pasteur observes, "Even though the seasonal influenza vaccine is considered a conventional vaccine by the industry, new challenges with respect to timing and availability of strains and the composition of the influenza vaccine are the rule" (Matthews 2006) . A special feature of the influenza vaccine industry is that a manufacturer does not decide the design of its own product (i.e., the composition of influenza vaccine). In the * We are indebted to several practitioners in the influenza vaccine industry who were willing to share their supply contracts with us but must remain anonymous to preserve confidentiality. We also thank seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, M&SOM Conference, and INFORMS Annual Meeting. An earlier version of this paper received the William Pierskalla Runner Up Award from INFORMS Health Applications Society in 2012.
United States, for example, the Vaccine and Related Biologic Products Advisory Committee (hereafter, Committee), which is independent of manufacturers, makes recommendation to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) about the annual vaccine composition in February or March of each year for the upcoming flu season that begins the following October. The timing of this decision creates remarkable challenges: On one hand, the production process is complex and highly uncertain; on the other hand, there is a tight time window left between the announcement of the composition and the start of the flu season. These challenges make it extremely difficult to match supply with demand; in particular, supply shortage can occur even when the total supply is abundant. As an illustrative example, influenza coverage recorded a decline to 41% in the [2000] [2001] influenza season, compared to 57% in the previous season; in the meanwhile, 7.5 million vaccine doses, or 10.6% of the total supply, remained unused by the end of the season (Nowalk et al. 2005; O'Mara et al. 2003) . Fukuda et al. (2002) explain this seemingly paradoxical situation as follows:
"The availability of influenza vaccine [in 2000 and 2001] was significantly lower during [October and November] than in previous years, which left many clinicians and patients unable to find vaccine and led to the cancellation of many vaccination campaigns. Ironically, in both years, increasing supplies of vaccine became available in December, but the waning levels of demand resulted in substantial surpluses of unused vaccine."
The common practice that vaccine manufacturers have adopted to improve their delivery performance is to start producing vaccines prior to the Committee's announcement of the vaccine composition (Committee 2007, pp. 102-103) . This option, however, involves the risk that a manufacturer's projected composition may differ from the Committee's decision-in this case, the whole batch of vaccine strains in production will have to be discarded. While the manufacturer bears the entire risk associated with this option, its benefit mostly accrues to a retailer (i.e., a health care provider) because the retailer can sell more vaccines delivered on-time by the manufacturer.
Thus, a well-designed supply contract needs to provide proper incentives for the manufacturer to improve its delivery performance.
Currently, most vaccine manufacturers distribute their products through two channels, each representing roughly 50% of vaccine sales/distribution (Health Industry Distributors Association 2011). In the first channel, the manufacturers sell vaccines directly to retailers (pharmacies, hospitals, public agencies, etc.); while in the second channel, they distribute vaccines through distributors who in turn deliver vaccines to their customers (primarily small physician offices). The focus of this paper is on the first channel, for which supply contracts between manufacturers and retailers are typically signed in January for vaccines to be delivered for the next flu season starting in October. Table 1 provides a representative sample of the contract terms used by two major influenza vaccine manufacturers (referred to as A and B, respectively) in the U.S. market during the three Table 1 Sample There are a couple of observations from Table 1 . First, the two manufacturers have used different contract terms; second, even for the same manufacturer, the contract terms may vary across different years. It seems that the industry has been experimenting different contract terms in order to improve supply chain efficiency. This indicates that there is a need to deepen our understanding about various contracts. In light of these observations, one may raise several natural questions about how to manage the influenza vaccine supply chain: Why do firms (e.g., Manufacturer A) use a complex contract (e.g., a D-QF contract) instead of its simpler counterpart (e.g., a QF contract)?
How do the traditional contracts such as the wholesale price contract and the revenue sharing contract perform? What contracting options should be recommended to improve the supply chain efficiency?
To answer these questions, we develop an analytical model that captures the following key sources of uncertainties in this supply chain:
• The product design is exogenous to a manufacturer because the Committee determines the composition of influenza vaccine (see above). Thus, if the manufacturer begins its production prior to design freeze (i.e., the Committee's composition decision), then it faces the risk associated with product design.
• The delivery lead time required for manufacturing and distributing vaccines is long (usually 6-8 months) and uncertain. Due to the long and complex processes of production, testing, releasing and 1 This information is based on the actual contracts which are not publicly available. Fictitious company names are used to maintain anonymity. In addition, we have found that two other manufacturers (referred to as C and D, respectively) used the same types of contracts during the 2009-2010 season: specifically, Manufacturer C used the same contract term as that of Manufacturer A except that it allowed 100% returns only for late-delivered items, and Manufacturer D used the exact same contract term as Manufacturer B.
distribution, a manufacturer has to make its production decision way in advance of the demand season, but its delivery of vaccine can still be delayed, especially when it begins its production after the design uncertainty is resolved.
• The demand is time-sensitive and uncertain. CDC (2011a) notes the time-sensitivity of the demand as follows: "manufacturers with vaccine coming off the production line in middle or late November or later may not be able to sell it all and providers receiving vaccine in this same time frame may not be able to convince patients to receive it, even though late season vaccination is encouraged and in most years will be beneficial." Moreover, according to Julie Gerberding, CDC director, "We're discovering now that the demand [for flu vaccine] is also very unpredictable" (Williams 2005) . The primary reason for such uncertainty is the difficulty of predicting flu activities.
During 2009-10 season, 43% of children (6 month-17 years) were vaccinated with seasonal flu vaccines, but 55% of them were vaccinated with seasonal and/or H1N1 supplement vaccine after the outbreak of H1N1 flu (Singleton 2011) . Because a retailer signs a contract usually in January, its forecast for the demand for the next flu season that starts the following October is fundamentally uncertain. By capturing the three sources of uncertainties, our model enables us to evaluate the performance of various supply contracts (see Table 2 for their abbreviations) and to address our research questions. We show that various well-studied contracts, such as the revenue-sharing contract, are not effective in inducing satisfactory delivery performance due to a negative feedback loop in the firms' incentives: On one hand, since the benefit of on-time delivery mostly accrues to the retailer, the manufacturer lacks the motivation to improve the on-time delivery performance, which leads to potential loss in demand. On the other hand, the concern of lost demand incentivizes the retailer to order a low quantity, which further reduces the manufacturer's incentive to improve the delivery performance of the supply chain. Hence the misaligned incentives lock the supply chain into a vicious cycle of eroding delivery performance. Specifically, we first prove that the revenue sharing contract often leads to zero delivery-improving effort from the manufacturer, and can perform even worse than the wholesale price contract. Second, we introduce two complex contracts, namely the D-QF and BLR contracts, which break this vicious cycle and coordinate the supply chain. Both of these contracts are complex contracts that have not been reported in the literature. Third, in the U.S. influenza vaccine market, the D-QF contract-instead of its simpler counterpart, the QF contract-has been adopted by some vaccine manufacturers (e.g., Manufacturers A and C), while the BLR contract has not appeared in our contract samples; however, we do observe the (irregular) use of the LR contract by Manufacturers B and D. Given the resemblance between the QF and D-QF contracts, as well as that between the LR and BLR contracts, we evaluate the performance of the QF and LR contracts against their complex counterparts. We show that these simple contracts can achieve near-optimal and robust performance under different conditions: the QF contract works well when the product margin is either very high or very low; the LR contract works well only when the retailer has a dominant bargaining power. The analysis of the above complex and simple contracts subsequently allows us to evaluate the contracts used currently in the industry, and to provide practical recommendations.
Although our study is motivated by the influenza vaccine industry, our model and analysis may apply to other industries of similar characteristics. For example, according to Jackson (2009) , in the apparel and footwear industry "the trends shift quickly and unpredictably, the deadlines are short and there are harsh consequences for delays," and on-time delivery is a crucial success factor in this industry because "apparel and footwear buying cycles are transitioning into shorter seasons.
The right product must be on the rack to be sold in the right season." The apparel and footwear manufacturers, often located overseas, may start producing certain products early to ensure on-time delivery, but the design or style may not be on trend for the selling season; or the manufacturers may postpone their production to observe the trend, at the risk of causing delayed deliveries. These tradeoffs resemble those in the vaccine industry, and can be addressed by the same analytical framework.
Literature Review
This work draws on and contributes to the following two streams of literature. First, we contribute to the rich literature of supply contracts by evaluating various (well-known and new) types of contracts in the new environment where a supply chain faces uncertainties in design, delivery, and demand. Second, this is the first paper that studies a contracting problem between an influenza vaccine manufacturer and a health care provider based on the real contracts used in practice.
Supply contracts have been studied extensively. Below we review only the papers that are most related to this paper, while referring readers to Cachon (2003) for a comprehensive review of early work. Our paper is related to the papers that study QF contract, buyback/returns, and rebates, which are intended to mitigate demand risk. Durango-Cohen and Yano (2006) provide a thorough review of the QF contract and its variants. In particular, Tsay (1999) is the first to model and analyze the QF contract. He characterizes the impact of QF contract parameters on the production and forecasting decisions of a supplier and a buyer in a supply chain with uncertain demand.
The buyback, revenue sharing, and return contracts have been widely studied in the literature, including Pasternack (1985) , Padmanabhan and Png (1997) , Lariviere (1998) , Arya and Mittendorf (2004) , Cachon and Lariviere (2005) , and Ha and Tong (2008) . Several papers in the literature have considered complex contracts that combine different aspects of previously known contracts:
for example, price protection, midlife returns, and end-of-life returns (Taylor 2001) , rebate and returns (Taylor 2002) , price and quantity commitment (Taylor and Plambeck 2007) . While these papers focus on demand uncertainty, our paper also addresses uncertainties in delivery timing and product design.
The issue of on-time delivery has been studied from various angles. Grout and Christy (1993) study purchasing contracts in a just-in-time setting where the delivery performance is controlled by the supplier. Under delivery uncertainty only, they show that a bonus scheme improves the on-time delivery performance. Cachon and Zhang (2006) consider the sourcing problem of a buyer whose operating costs are affected by both the procurement price and delivery lead time. They characterize the optimal procurement mechanisms and identify two simpler but effective strategies. Hwang et al. (2012) consider the per-unit penalty contract adopted by retailers (e.g., Walmart)
that resembles the late-rebate (LR) contract studied in our paper, but in their model the supplier has a single production mode. Our paper differs significantly from and thus enriches the on-time delivery literature in that, in the context of the vaccine industry, there is a delivery-design tradeoff.
To mitigate delivery risk, a manufacturer in our model operates under a dual-production mode, which resembles the setting of Donohue (2000) that models a fast fashion supply chain with two production modes: one is cheap but has a long lead time, and another is expensive but more responsive to market demand. Three key differences separate our paper from Donohue's. First, in our paper, early production helps improve delivery performance, whereas in Donohue's case it reduces the production cost. Second, we consider uncertainties in design, delivery and demand, while Donohue considers only demand uncertainty. Third, our paper analyzes various supply contracts observed in the vaccine industry, while Donohue focuses on the wholesale price contract.
The second related literature studies various operational issues in the influenza vaccine supply chain. Chick et al. (2008) propose the first influenza vaccine supply chain model, and show that if a central government can select a fraction of a population to vaccinate, then the government can use a variation of the cost-sharing contract to induce a manufacturer to produce socially-optimal quantity. Deo and Corbett (2009) analyze the effect of yield uncertainty on competition among vaccine manufacturers. Cho (2010) studies the Committee's problem of choosing an optimal vaccine composition with dynamic information updating, taking into account its impact on subsequent production decisions. Arifoglu et al. (2012) study the impact of yield uncertainty and self-interested consumers on the inefficiency in this supply chain, and analyze the effectiveness of government interventions through partial centralization. Mamani et al. (2012) and Adida et al. (2011) study how the government can induce a socially optimal vaccine coverage through subsidies to a manufacturer and consumers. Recently, Chick et al. (2012) extend Chick et al. (2008) by considering a setting where the manufacturer has to satisfy the exact demand determined by the government: if a low production yield leads to a shortfall, then the manufacturer is required to make up the difference at a higher production cost, and the government incurs an extra administrative expense. In this setting, they show that the supply chain is coordinated when the additional expense of the government is transferred to the manufacturer.
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Our paper makes the following contributions to this literature. First, our paper is the first to consider a healthcare provider in the U.S. influenza vaccine supply chain who places an order to a manufacturer and then distributes vaccines to consumers. This research perspective is shared by a recent case study of Deo et al. (2012) . Based on the real contracts used in practice, we study various sophisticated contracts between a healthcare provider and a manufacturer. Second, we employ several new modeling elements that reflect the industry characteristics such as uncertain delivery timing, early production mode associated with design risks, and time-sensitive uncertain demand. Finally, while the previous literature studies the effectiveness of potential government interventions through partial centralization or subsidies, we shed light on improvement opportunities through coordinating contracts between firms in this supply chain, which do not require government interventions.
Modeling Framework
We consider a supply chain consisting of two risk-neutral firms, a manufacturer and a retailer. As commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., Chick et al. 2008 , Arifoglu et al. 2012 , the retailer sells a product at a fixed price p. The associated demand, denoted by ξ, follows a distribution F (·) with density f (·).
3 To model the time-sensitivity of the demand, we consider two selling periods:
an ideal period, and a late period. Demand arrives during the ideal period. If, by the end of the ideal period, there is unmet demand due to inadequate supply, then a proportion γ ∈ (0, 1) of the unserved customers will not return for vaccination, and the rest will return during the late period. Thus, the parameter γ captures the time-sensitivity of demand. 4 Based on these demand characteristics, the retailer determines the order quantity Q, which incurs an administrative cost of c o (≥ 0) per unit that captures the burden of placing, tracking, and receiving the order.
The manufacturer operates in dual production modes: "regular" and "early", with respective subscripts r and e. Under the regular production mode, the manufacturer has an uncertain delivery lead time and cannot always deliver the product in a timely fashion. With probability α ∈ (0, 1), the delivery is on time (i.e., satisfying the demand during the ideal period); with probability (1 − α), the delivery is late (i.e., satisfying the demand during the late period). The manufacturer also has the early production mode, in which the manufacturer starts production before the product design (i.e., vaccine composition) is finalized. The early production mode guarantees on-time delivery but is vulnerable to design uncertainty: with probability β ∈ (0, 1), the early production uses the same composition as the finalized one, and with probability (1 − β), the early production uses a different composition, in which case the whole batch of vaccine in production has to be discarded. The respective unit production costs under the regular and early production modes are c r and c e . Under the dual-production-mode setting, the manufacturer first needs to decide the early production quantity, denoted by Q e . Hence, given Q and Q e , the regular production quantity, denoted by Q r , can be one of following two quantities depending on the outcome of the early production mode:
5
Q r = Q − Q e with probability β Q with probability (1 − β).
Below we specify the sequence of events (see Figure 1 ):
• t = 1: The retailer determines an order quantity Q, and the manufacturer, after receiving the retailer order, determines an early production quantity Q e .
• t = 2: Upon the release of the finalized product design, the manufacturer determines the regular production quantity Q r according to equation (1).
• The ideal period (between t = 3 and t = 4): With probability β, early-production outputs are delivered to the retailer during this period. In addition, with probability α, regular-production outputs are delivered during this period.
• The late period (between t = 4 and t = 5): Among the unserved customers in the ideal period, a fraction (1 − γ) of them will return to seek vaccination. On the supply side, with probability
(1 − α), regular production outputs are delivered to satisfy such residual demand.
The retailer places an order of ! units to the manufacturer. The manufacturer decides ! ! , the early production quantity, and starts the early production.
Product design is finalized. If the early production is successful (with probability !), the manufacturer proceeds to produce ! ! ! ! ! ! ! under the regular mode; otherwise, the manufacturer chooses ! ! ! !.
Products from both early production (if successful) and regular production (on-time with probability !) are shipped to the retailer to meet the demand realized during the ideal period.
!! ! !! of the unfilled demand (if any) returns to the retailer and is met by late delivery from the regular production (if any).
Figure 1 Sequence of Events in the Dual-Production-Mode Setting
For notational convenience, we define an indicator I to be I = 1 if products from the regular production are delivered on time, 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we define another indicator J ∈ {1, 0} to represent whether or not the early production matches the Committee's recommendation. 6 We have Pr(I = 1) = α, Pr(I = 0) = 1 − α, Pr(J = 1) = β, and Pr(J = 0) = 1 − β. Table 3 lists three cases depending on the realization of I and J. Table 3 Three Cases of Delivery and Early Production Outcome Case 1. I = 1 (on time delivery) with probability α Case 2. I = 0 (late delivery) and J = 1 (successful early production) with probability (1 − α)β Case 3. I = 0 (late delivery) and J = 0 (unsuccessful early production) with probability (1 − α)(1 − β)
The ex post sales quantity, denoted by Z, falls into one of the following three cases:
6 The uncertainty associated with the production of influenza vaccine has two dimensions: delivery timing and output quantity. As discussed earlier, the first dimension has been one of the primary causes of mismatch between demand and supply, but has never been studied in the literature. Thus, our paper focuses on the first dimension, while suppressing the second dimension to maintain tractability. If we incorporate the second dimension as the fourth source of uncertainty in our model, then we need to model a manufacturer's choice of the quantity of raw materials (i.e., chicken eggs) for both early and regular production modes (denoted by ne and nr, respectively). If we assume, using Proposition 1 in Chick et al. (2008) , that the manufacturer sets the total quantity of raw materials as Q/K (so that nr = Q/K − J · ne), where K > 0 is a constant determined by the distribution of the random yield, then all of our results remain valid.
where (ξ −Q e ) + = max{ξ −Q e , 0}. In Case 1, those items produced in the regular mode are delivered on-time, and thus the whole order Q is delivered on-time, regardless of the outcome of the early production; in Case 2, the regular production is late and the early production is successful; and in Case 3, the regular production is late and the early production is not successful. The expected sales quantity is thus:
Note that Q e appears only in the second term of the right-hand side of (3), suggesting that the early production helps ease the supply shortage when the regular production mode yields late delivery.
For future comparison, we now analyze the first-best scenario in which a central decision maker jointly determines the order quantity Q and the early production quantity Q e to maximize the supply chain profit. Let π S (Q, Q e ) denote the expected profit of the supply chain. The solution to the following problem:
is referred to as the first-best solution and denoted by (Q F B , Q F B e ). In (4), (c r + c o )Q + (c e − βc r )Q e is the total expected cost, and is derived from
We assume that c e > βc r -which includes the case that c e = c r -to focus on a realistic situation where there is a tradeoff between the delivery advantage of early production and informational advantage of regular production. This assumption guarantees the following result:
All proofs are presented in Appendix A. In the first-best solution, it is possible that the manufacturer operates only under the regular production mode, i.e., Q
F B e
= 0. Indeed, we can show that it is worthwhile introducing the early production mode only when the delivery from the regular production mode is unreliable (i.e., α is low), the prediction for the finalized design is sufficiently accurate (i.e., β is high), and the early production mode is inexpensive (i.e., c e − βc r is low).
We proceed to consider a decentralized supply chain under different supply contracts. A contract is said to coordinate the supply chain if it induces the first-best solution (Q F B , Q F B e ) from the firms comprising the supply chain. One major performance metric we use in evaluating supply contracts is the efficiency of the supply chain, which is defined as the ratio of the supply chain's expected profit under a contract to that in the first-best scenario. We focus on the interesting case where
= 0 means that the early production is not a viable option. We start with analyzing the revenue sharing contract in §4, followed by two complex contracts in §5, and then compare the performance with their simpler counterparts in §6-7.
Impact of Negative Incentive Feedback Loop
A number of coordinating contracts have been proposed and studied in the supply chain management literature (e.g., Cachon 2003) . Thus, we start with analyzing these existing coordination contracts in our setting. In this section, we first analyze the revenue sharing (RS) contract, and then introduce the notion of the negative feedback loop formed between the two firms. Under this contract, the retailer pays the manufacturer a wholesale price w for each unit of order, plus a percentage, denoted by ψ, of the retailer's revenue. Given ψ ∈ (0, 1), we can express the manufacturer's profit and the retailer's profit, respectively, as follows:
It is well-known that revenue sharing achieves coordination for a traditional supply chain consisting of a newsvendor retailer and a supplier (see, e.g., Cachon and Lariviere 2005) . Does this result continue to hold in our supply chain that involves three types of uncertainties? The next proposition provides the answer to this question.
(i) Under a revenue sharing contract, the manufacturer will always choose Q e =0.
(ii) The revenue sharing contract is strictly dominated by the wholesale price contract in terms of supply chain efficiency.
Proposition 1 is a surprising result. First, the revenue sharing contract fails to coordinate the supply chain because it induces Q e = 0; second, the supply chain performance under the revenue sharing contract is even worse than that under the wholesale price contract because under the revenue sharing contract the retailer orders even less than under the wholesale price contract.
This indicates that the existing results in the literature (e.g., revenue sharing can coordinate a supply chain) may no longer hold in our problem setting. We offer the following explanation to this counter-intuitive result.
A prominent feature of the vaccine supply chain is the presence of the delivery uncertainty. One way to mitigate this uncertainty is to use the early production mode. However, early production is risky because of the product design uncertainty, and, as a result, the manufacturer may not have the right incentive when choosing the early production quantity. Thus, compared to the traditional supply chain setting, in addition to the retailer's ordering decision, we also need to coordinate the manufacturer's early production decision. Clearly, from the result that Q e = 0 in Proposition 1, we know that the revenue sharing scheme does not resolve the incentive problem for the manufacturer at all. This, in conjunction with the observation that the retailer orders less under the revenue sharing contract than under the wholesale price contract, implies that revenue sharing provides even less incentive to overcome double marginalization than the wholesale price contract. This is in stark contrast with the supply chain coordination literature where it is widely believed that revenue sharing can induce a higher order quantity from the retailer.
Close scrutiny of the supply chain dynamics may help us reveal the driving force behind this surprising result. To this end, we first characterize the relationship between the two critical decisions in the supply chain (which holds irrespective of a specific contract used).
Lemma 2(i) means that the expected sales E[Z(Q, Q e )] increases both in the manufacturer's early production quantity Q e and in the retailer's order quantity Q. Lemma 2(ii) suggests that the marginal benefit of a higher order quantity Q increases in Q e , because the retailer can expect more on-time delivered products from increased Q e and hence a lower chance of lost sales. Interestingly, Lemma 2(ii) also suggests that the marginal benefit of early production increases in the order quantity Q as well. In other words, the decisions Q e and Q are complementary to each other: a higher order quantity Q will make early production more beneficial to the supply chain, and vice versa. This leads to a negative feedback loop in the firms' incentives in our supply chain: On one hand, when the manufacturer bears the risk associated with the early production mode, it lacks the motivation to improve the on-time delivery performance, which leads to potential loss in demand;
on the other hand, the demand loss incentivizes the retailer to reduce its order quantity, which further discourages the manufacturer from making efforts to achieve on-time delivery.
The above vicious cycle is instrumental behind the surprising outcome presented in Proposition 1.
Since revenue sharing offers little incentive for the manufacturer to use early production, the retailer will choose a relatively low order quantity Q; this further prevents the manufacturer from operating in the early production mode. In fact, the negative incentive is so strong that the manufacturer often chooses Q e = 0 under the revenue sharing contract. In this case, since the manufacturer chooses not to operate in the early production mode, the percentage of revenue sharing (ψ) does not have any impact on the manufacturer's decision. On the retailer's side, however, a higher ψ induces the retailer to place a smaller order, hence deviating further from the first-best order quantity. Therefore, revenue sharing may induce an even lower order quantity than the wholesale price contract, which implies an inferior supply chain performance.
To understand the condition given in Proposition 1 (i.e., (1 − α)βγ[p − (w + c o )] < c e − βc r ), note that in its left-hand side, γ[p − (w + c o )] represents the retailer's maximum proportion (γ) of lost net revenue [p − (w + c o )] when late delivery occurs, and (1 − α)β represents the probability for the early production mode to effectively function against late delivery (cf. Case 2 in Table 3 ). Hence the left-hand side is the maximum expected benefit of the earlier production mode to the retailer. The right-hand side of the condition is the expected additional cost of operating in the early production mode. The condition suggests that, even if the retailer is willing to share all the benefits of on-time delivery with the manufacturer, the manufacturer still lacks the incentive to operate in the early production mode. When the condition is violated, we can numerically show that the manufacturer's chosen early production quantity is still substantially lower than the first-best level, and that the revenue sharing contract does not perform significantly better than the wholesale price contract.
To our knowledge, the above result (i.e., the wholesale price contract can outperform the revenue sharing contract) has not been previously reported in the literature. Nevertheless, it seems to corroborate the industry observation: While we are unaware of the revenue sharing arrangement, we do observe several instances of the wholesale price contract in the influenza vaccine industry (e.g., Manufacturer B in Table 1 ).
Similarly, we have examined other coordinating contracts studied commonly in the literature (such as buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, and sales rebate), and find that they cannot coordinate our supply chain, either. To save space, we present the detailed analysis of these contracts in Appendix B. A common problem in these contracts is that they do not provide sufficient incentives for the manufacturer to choose the first-best early production quantity; hence, due to the negative feedback loop described above, the retailer will not use the first-best order quantity, either. In the next section we propose two contracts that can overcome this negative feedback loop and coordinate the supply chain.
Supply Contracts for Channel Coordination
So far we have shown that due to the negative feedback loop, traditional contracts cannot coordinate the vaccine supply chain. In this section, we apply two criteria when searching for coordinating contracts: First, the contract must be able to induce the desirable actions from the supply chain firms (i.e., they are indeed coordinating); second, they are connected to the real contracts observed in practice (i.e., they are practically appealing). Also, we assume that the manufacturer's early production quantity is not verifiable by the retailer and hence cannot be contracted. We propose two coordinating contracts: D-QF contract in §5.1, and BLR contract in §5.2.
Delivery-Time-Dependent Quantity Flexibility (D-QF) Contract
Under the traditional QF contract, the retailer is allowed to return no more than a portion of the order quantity at full price. By contrast, under a D-QF contract, the maximum returning quantity (hereafter return allowance) depends on the timing of delivery. To our best knowledge, while this contract has been adopted by some vaccine manufacturers (see Manufacturer A in Table 1), it has not been reported in the literature. Let Y 1 be the shipping quantity by the end of the ideal period, and Y 2 the shipping quantity after the ideal period. The return allowance is then equal to κ 1 Y 1 + κ 2 Y 2 , where κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ [0, 1] are the returnable proportions of the delivery quantities for on-time and late deliveries, respectively. Hence the return allowance is a random variable and can be represented as
When κ 1 = κ 2 , such a return policy is equivalent to the QF contract previously studied in the literature. We denote by R d (Q, Q e ) the total returning quantity at the end of a demand season under the D-QF contract:
The transfer payment from the manufacturer to the retailer is given by
Comparing the return allowance κ 1 Y 1 + κ 2 Y 2 with the leftover inventory Q − Z(Q, Q e ), we can express the returning quantity R d (Q, Q e ) as follows.
Case 1. I = 1. In this case, κ 1 Y 1 + κ 2 Y 2 = κ 1 Q from (5) and Q − Z(Q, Q e ) = Q − min{Q, ξ} from (2). Therefore,
Case 2. I = 0 and J = 1. In this case, κ 1 Y 1 +κ 2 Y 2 = κ 1 Q e +κ 2 (Q−Q e ) from (5), and Q−Z(Q, Q e ) = Q − min{Q e , ξ} − min{Q − Q e , (1 − γ)(ξ − Q e ) + } from (2). For ease of exposition, let us define the following three numbers:
where ξ (1) (resp., ξ (2) ) is the demand level at which the leftover inventory is equal to the return allowance when ξ < Q e (resp, Q e ≤ ξ < ξ (3) ), and ξ (3) is the demand level above which there will be no leftover inventory (implying that ξ (2) < ξ (3) ). By comparing the leftover inventory with the return allowance, we can derive the return quantity in each of the following two subcases:
Case 3. I = 0 and J = 0. In this case, (5), and Q − Z(Q, Q e ) = Q − min{Q, (1 − γ)ξ} from (2). Therefore,
The following proposition provides the necessary condition for the D-QF contract to coordinate the supply chain when Q
F B e
> 0. Later in section 6.1, we prove that the QF contract never coordinates the supply chain unless early production is not a viable option (i.e., Q F B e = 0).
> 0, to coordinate the supply chain, the D-QF contract must have parameters (κ 1 , κ 2 ) that satisfy κ 2 > κ 1 , and one of the following two conditions:
The proof of the proposition is technical but its intuition is as follows. There are two contract parameters, κ 1 and κ 2 , to specify in the D-QF contract. To coordinate the supply chain, a contract must not only induce the retailer to choose an order quantity of Q F B units, but also induce the manufacturer to choose an early production quantity of Q F B
e . The first condition in Proposition 2 that κ 2 > κ 1 is expected because otherwise the manufacturer will not bear the delivery risk associated with regular production. The condition κ 2 > κ 1 has also been observed in practice: in the example shown in Table 1 , Manufacturer A uses κ 2 = 50% > κ 1 = 25%. In addition to κ 2 > κ 1 , one of the two conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2 must be satisfied to guarantee that the manufacturer choose Q Proposition 2 provides the necessary conditions for the D-QF contract to coordinate the supply chain; it does not guarantee the existence of a coordinating D-QF contract. To coordinate the supply chain, the contract also needs to motivate the retailer to choose an ordering quantity that matches its first-best level. In our numerical experiments presented in §7, the D-QF contract coordinates the supply chain in 48.1% of the instances; in the case when the D-QF contract does not coordinate the supply chain, it still induces a fairly high supply chain efficiency with the average of 98.8%.
Buyback-and-Late-Rebate (BLR) Contract
The second coordinating contract, namely BLR contract, is a variant of the well-known buyback contract. Specifically, we incorporate a late rebate term into the traditional buyback contract. Note that the LR contract has been observed in the vaccine industry (see Table 1 ). Under the BLR contract, the manufacturer provides the retailer with a rebate for late-delivered products in addition to providing the retailer with a buyback credit for each unsold unit. This contract is based on two quantities that are observable to both the manufacturer and the retailer: the leftover inventory and the late-delivered quantity. We use ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ · w is the rebate from the wholesale price w for late-delivered unit. Thus, the expected transfer payment from the manufacturer to the retailer is represented as
In (12), the first term is the manufacture's expected buyback credit to the retailer, and the second term is the manufacturer's expected rebate, in which late-delivered quantity is 0 with probability α (in Case 1), Q − Q e with probability (1 − α)β (in Case 2), and Q with probability (1 − α)(1 − β) (in Case 3). The proposition below details the BLR contract that coordinates the supply chain.
Proposition 3. The BLR contract coordinates the supply chain if and only if
The following corollary provides comparative statics to show the impact of α, β, and γ on the optimal BLR contract parameters b * BLR and ρ * BLR .
Corollary 1. Under the BLR contract, the following results hold:
In the BLR contract, while the rebate component motivates the manufacturer to operate in the early production mode, the buyback component incentivizes the retailer to increase the order quantity. As α increases, the regular production mode becomes more reliable. Thus a higher rebate rate (ρ * BLR ) is needed to motivate the manufacturer to operate in the early production mode, but the buyback price (b * BLR ) remains unchanged because α does not affect the expected additional cost of early production (c e − βc r ). The profit division of the supply chain between the two firms is directly tied to the buyback price b * BLR and thus remains unchanged. As β increases, early production is less costly. Even a lower rebate rate (ρ * BLR ) can now provide the manufacturer with adequate incentive. To encourage the retailer to place a large order, the manufacturer offers a higher buyback price (b * BLR ), which gives the retailer a higher profit share. Interestingly, the optimal contract parameters are independent of the time-sensitivity parameter γ, which does not affect the cost structure or the delivery performance of the supply chain. Thus, the optimal BLR contract coordinates the supply chain even when γ is a function of the on-time-delivered quantity (see the proof of Proposition 3).
We close this section by briefly discussing the flexibility of profit division between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the optimal BLR contract, the retailer's profit share is b *
Therefore, the profit of the supply chain can be arbitrarily divided between the firms by adjusting wholesale price w. Likewise, we can numerically show that under the D-QF contract, any profit division between the firms can be achieved by adjusting w.
Analysis of Simple Contracts
This section evaluates the performance of the two simpler contracts, namely, QF and LR contracts.
Our analysis in this section focuses on their analytical properties, which will be complemented by numerical experiments in the next section.
QF Contract
We have shown that the D-QF contract can conditionally coordinate the supply chain. The D-QF contract needs to specify two parameters (κ 1 and κ 2 ), and requires tracking the quantity of ontime-and late-delivered items. This makes the D-QF contract more cumbersome to implement in Table 4 Returning Quantity R(Q, Qe) Under Different Cases Case 1. R(Q, Qe) = 8 > < > :
Case 3. R(Q, Qe) = 8 > < > :
practice than a simple QF contract. Thus, we analyze the QF contract, a well-studied contract under which the manufacturer provides the retailer with full credit for the leftover inventory up to a pre-determined threshold. It is much simpler than the D-QF contract because it involves only a single parameter and does not depend on the timing of delivery.
While there exist different specifications of the threshold, we focus on the QF contract where the threshold is a proportion of the order quantity, as is commonly assumed in the QF literature (e.g., Tsay 1999 , Cachon and Lariviere 2001 , and Plambeck and Taylor 2005 . We denote by κ ∈ (0, 1) the proportion of the retailer's ordering quantity Q that is allowed to return after the sales season.
This contract can be viewed as a special case of the D-QF contract where κ 1 = κ 2 . The returning quantity, denoted by R(Q, Q e ), is then R(Q, Q e ) = min{κQ, Q − Z(Q, Q e )}, where
is the leftover inventory. Since the manufacturer provides full credit for returns, its total transfer payment to the retailer, denoted by T c (Q, Q e ), is equal to w ·R(Q, Q e ). Similar to the D-QF contract in §5.1, the returning quantity R(Q, Q e ) takes different values, as shown in Table 4 .
While the literature establishes that the QF contract can coordinate a supply chain when a set of conditions are met (cf. Cachon 2003, §6.2.5), the following proposition states otherwise.
Proposition 4. Unless the early production mode is not a viable option (i.e., Q F B e = 0), the QF contract does not coordinate the supply chain.
Remark 1. QF contract is a special case of the D-QF contract with κ 1 = κ 2 . If we relate this to the necessary conditions for supply chain coordination in Proposition 2, it is apparent that the QF contract satisfies the first part of the condition (ii), but does not satisfy the second part.
Remark 2. Like the revenue sharing contract (as discussed in §4), the QF contract does not coordinate the supply chain because the manufacturer is not provided with adequate incentive to operate in the early production mode. However, while revenue sharing leads to a vicious cycle of eroding delivery performance and can perform even worse than the wholesale price contract, we later demonstrate in our numerical experiments that the QF contract motivates the retailer to choose a larger order quantity, and hence does not lead to the vicious cycle.
Late Rebate (LR) Contract
Our analysis in §5.2 suggests that the BLR contract can coordinate the supply chain. In the vaccine industry, however, we observe that manufacturers adopt a simple LR contract under which they offer a rebate for orders shipped after the ideal vaccination period. For example, Manufacturer B provided a 10% rebate for late-delivered doses during the 2009-2010 season (see Table 1 ). Compared to the BLR contract, the LR contract is easier to implement because it does not require tracking left-over inventory.
We denote by ρ LR a proportion of the wholesale price w that the manufacturer rebates to the retailer for late-delivered items. Under this contract, the manufacturer's expected profit and the retailer's expected profit can be expressed respectively as follows:
Next, we provide the condition for the LR contract to coordinate the supply chain. Proposition 5 shows that the LR contract coordinates the supply chain only when the retailer has a dominating bargaining power and earns all supply chain profit. This contract requires a wholesale price above the unit production cost (since w = c e /β is greater than both c e and c r ), and a rebate that depends on the quantity of late-delivered items. This simple contract effectively transfers all the risk due to early production from the manufacturer to the retailer without necessitating the retailer's engagement in monitoring the manufacturer's production activities.
Since the retailer is unlikely to have a dominating bargaining power in practice, it is usually the case that w > c e /β, and the retailer has to share its profit with the manufacturer. Thus, we evaluate the LR contract for the case when w > c e /β in our numerical study.
Numerical Study
In §6, we have analyzed the QF and LR contracts, and showed that the QF contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, while the LR contract can do so only under a restrictive condition.
In §7.1 and §7.2, we numerically evaluate their performance against their complex counterparts, D-QF and BLR contracts studied in §5.1 and §5.2, respectively. This way we can shed some light on the trade-off between contract simplicity and performance. Then in §7.3, we evaluate the contracts listed in Table 1 and provide recommendations for improving the supply chain efficiency.
As is common in the supply contract literature, the demand is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, with a density of f (ξ) = b Table 5 , are loosely based on the U.S. influenza vaccine market and justified in Appendix C. We vary these parameter values in our subsequent analysis for robustness of our results. 
Performance of QF Contract
We evaluate the performance of the QF contract under different margins of the supply chain.
Interestingly, the left panel of Figure 2 gives the following observation:
Observation 1 The performance of the QF contract is near-optimal when the profit margin is either very high or very low, whereas the performance suffers when the profit margin is medium.
The intuition is that when the profit margin is high (i.e., the unit cost is low), the optimal QF contract provides a generous return allowance and hence motivates the retailer to place a large order (see the right panel of Figure 2 ), which, in turn, motivates the manufacturer to choose a high early production quantity. (Note that although the supply chain efficiency is close to 100%, the supply chain is not perfectly coordinated when Q
F B e
> 0 according to Proposition 4.) When the profit margin of the supply chain is low, however, from our discussion in §3 we know that Q F B e = 0, meaning that the early production mode is not a viable option. The supply chain can therefore be perfectly coordinated using a QF contract, as is the case where there is a single production mode.
Next, we examine the sensitivity of the performance of the QF contract with respect to the flexibility parameter (κ). As shown by the solid line in Figure 3 , the QF contract exhibits robust and near-optimal performance for a wide range of the flexibility parameter around the optimal κ * = 0.60. Figure 3 also shows the firms' profit shares under the QF contract. One immediate implication is that the manufacturer can choose a low κ to gain a higher profit share without significantly jeopardizing the efficiency of the supply chain. The performance of the QF contract under different production costs. The left panel shows the supply chain efficiency, and the right panel shows the ratio of the retailer's equilibrium ordering quantity (Q * ) to the first-best ordering quantity (Q F B ). We vary the production cost cr = ce from $3 to $17.5, and set the wholesale price w = 0.6p + 0.4cr. Other parameters follow the base parameters as listed in Table 5 . Table 5 .
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Figure 4
The supply chain efficiency and firms' profit shares under different wholesale prices. The x-axis is the ratio of w to ce/β. Other parameters follow the base parameters as listed in Table 5 .
Performance of LR Contract
Earlier in §6.2, Proposition 5 has shown that the LR contract coordinates the supply chain only when w = c e /β, at which the retailer takes all of the supply chain profit. We now numerically examine the impact of different wholesale prices. Figure 4 shows that the LR contract can achieve satisfactory performance when w is sufficiently close to c e /β (i.e., the retailer has a dominating bargaining power). For example, when w = 1.5c e /β, the retailer's profit share is 83.6%, and the supply chain efficiency is 98.9%. However, the performance of the supply chain declines as w deviates further from c e /β. For example, when w = 2.2c e /β, the retailer's profit share and the supply chain efficiency drop to 65.6% and 94.8%, respectively. 
Evaluation of Contracts Used in Practice
We now evaluate the performance of the sample contracts used by Manufacturers A and B during the period 2009-2011, as shown in Table 1 . For both firms, we assume that c e = c r = $3, and p = $18. We use the actual wholesale prices for 0.5ml syringe offered by Manufacturers A and B, its wholesale price was lower than that of Manufacturer A by 15% on average. Thus, for fair comparison between the LR contract and the wholesale price contract, we use the wholesale price for the wholesale price contract that is lower by 15% than that for the LR contract. Table 6 shows the firms' profit shares and the supply chain efficiency under different combinations of (α, β, γ).
We observe that the supply chain's efficiency is above 80% in most of the instances, suggesting that both firms' contracts can achieve reasonable performance. Furthermore, we make the following recommendations to improve these supply contracts:
(i) Manufacturer A can keep the current D-QF contract but consider using higher return allowance proportions to increase the supply chain efficiency: our additional numerical study sug-gests that in the optimal D-QF contracts, on average, κ * 1 = 47%, κ * 2 = 58%, with a supply chain efficiency of 99.8%. On the other hand, we find that if Manufacturer A is only concerned about maximizing its own profit, then it is optimal to set κ * 1 = 0 and κ * 2 = 95%, which is close to that of Manufacturer C (see §1).
(ii) For the ease of implementation, Manufacturer A can switch to the QF contract with κ chosen around 50%, at which point the supply chain efficiency is 99.86%. Our further numerical study shows that if Manufacturer A is only concerned about its own profit maximization, then it is optimal to use a lower κ (on average, κ * = 9%, with a supply chain efficiency of 91.33%).
(iii) Manufacturer B should switch from its current wholesale price contract back to the LR contract. Doing this will improve the supply chain efficiency (from the average of 85.35% to 88.98%
as shown in Table 6 ) as well as the manufacturer's profit share (from the average of 41.61% to 46.50%). For further improvement, we recommend that Manufacturer B use the BLR contract for it gives the supply chain a higher level of efficiency and flexibility of profit division.
Extensions
We now discuss two extensions to our model. §8.1 extends the distribution of early production mode to be continuous. §8.2 discusses the case when the performance metric is social welfare instead of the efficiency of the supply chain.
When Early Production Outcome Is Continuous
So far we have captured the uncertainty in product design by assuming that early production will be completely wasted if the projected design does not match the final design. While this is true in the influenza vaccine industry, a manufacturer in other industries might be able to recover a proportion of the products. This is particularly true in the apparel and footwear industry.
We now assume that the early production results in a continuous, uncertain outcome. Specifically, a proportionθ-a random variable with a pdf of h(·), a cdf of H(·), and a mean of θ-of the units in the early production mode is retained after the finalized design is announced. The sequence of events remains the same as in Figure 1 , but the relationship between Q e and Q r is now generalized as Q r = Q −θQ e . The manufacturer's expected production cost is now E[c e Q e + c r Q r ] = E[c e Q e + c r (Q −θQ e )] = c r Q + (c e − θc r )Q e . The expected selling quantity, givenθ, can be represented as Z(Q, Q e |θ) = min{Q, d} with probability α min{θQ e , d} + min{Q −θQ e , (1 − γ)(d −θQ e ) + } with probability 1 − α.
Despite the more general representations of the production cost and the expected sales quantity, we can extend the BLR contract to the case in which early production yield a continuous outcome set. The following corollary is immediate from (3) by replacing β with θ: coordinates the supply chain.
We can also show that the LR contract coordinates the supply chain only when w = c e /θ and the retailer takes all the profit of the supply chain, and the supply chain efficiency deteriorates when w deviates from c e /θ. Numerically, we have also verified that the QF contract never coordinates the supply chain unless the early production is not viable, while the D-QF contract can coordinate the supply chain in some cases. Therefore, the qualitative results will remain unchanged when early production uncertainty follows a continuous distribution.
Social Welfare
We have focused our attention on designing supply contracts that maximize the supply chain's expected profit. Now we bring consumers' benefits into context and analyze the impact of supply contract design on social welfare. Consistent with extant literature, we define the social welfare as the sum of consumers' surplus and the supply chain's profit. We assume that consumers' aggregated benefits from consuming the product is V (z) when the selling quantity is Z(Q, Q e ) = z, where V (·)
is assumed to be a concave increasing function, reflecting the diminishing marginal improvement in social welfare from a higher coverage. The expected social welfare W (Q, Q e ) can be represented similar to (4) as follows:
In the influenza vaccine industry, when the initial fraction of infected population is small, Chick et al. (2008) show that the net benefits from vaccination can be represented in a piecewise-linear form. We define v as each consumer's surplus from vaccination, and rewrite (13) as
Comparing (14) with (4), we see that the expected social welfare differs from the expected supply chain profit mainly in the value associated with the expected selling quantity Z(Q, Q e ). When v > p, the social planner values each unit of sold product more than the supply chain would, so we expect that the selling quantity in the social optimum is higher than that in the market equilibrium.
One way to address the social welfare gap is to introduce a third party that provides a subsidy s to the retailer-rather than the manufacturer-for each unit of products that are shipped and sold to consumers. At s = v − p, the retailer's total unit revenue from a consumer and from the third party is exactly v, and the analysis of all the supply contracts remains the same. We therefore expect that using government subsidies, together with well-calibrated supply contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer, would bring the vaccine market closer to the social optimum. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a contract design problem for the U.S. influenza vaccine supply chain that faces uncertainties in the design, delivery, and demand of the product. To mitigate the risk of late delivery, the manufacturer operates in two production modes: the regular production mode that starts production after the design uncertainty is resolved, and the early production mode that starts production before the design is finalized. The manufacturer faces a trade-off between the informational advantage of the regular production, and the delivery advantage of the early production. Currently, the industry is experimenting different contract terms aiming to improve the efficiency of the supply chain. This makes our study both explanatory and prescriptive.
Our analysis reveals that without the careful design of a supply contract, a vicious incentive cycle may arise: because the manufacturer bears the risk associated with the early production mode, it lacks incentive to improve the on-time delivery, which reduces the retailers order size in anticipation of truncated demand; and this further discourages the manufacturer from making efforts to improve its delivery performance. Surprisingly, we have found that the revenue sharing contract may lead to zero delivery-improving effort, and perform even worse than the wholesale price contract. Therefore, we propose two coordinating contracts: the Delivery-time-dependent Quantity Flexibility (D-QF) contract, and the Buyback-and-Late-Rebate (BLR) contract. In view of the complexity of these contracts, we move on to consider their simpler counterparts that are easier to implement. We conduct extensive numerical experiments based on realistic values from the U.S. influenza vaccine industry, and show that the QF contract, despite its low informational requirement and simple contract structure, can achieve near-optimal performance when the gross margin of the product is either very high or very low. A simple LR contract, by contrast, performs well only when the wholesale price is relatively low such that the retailer takes a major portion of the supply chain profit. These insights can help practitioners design supply contracts for improving on-time delivery performance of the influenza vaccine supply chain, and potentially those of other supply chains with similar characteristics (e.g., the apparel and footwear industry).
There are several interesting future research avenues. Motivated also by the influenza vaccine industry, Federgruen and Yang (2008) and Cho and Tang (2012) consider supply chain models under uncertain demand and supply-the former studies an issue of selecting a portfolio of suppliers under a fixed wholesale price, and the latter studies the benefits of dynamic ordering and selling under a wholesale price contract. Studying sophisticated contracts among multiple suppliers in the dynamic setting will be an interesting direction for future research. Also, it would be interesting the demand of the entire population. Therefore, it is not practically possible to estimate the value of vaccination to a consumer of that retailer. Our discussion in this section intends to illustrate the need of a government subsidy to a retailer, but not to propose a method to estimate the right amount of the subsidy, which is left for future research.
to study the manufacturers' contract choices in a competitive setting, i.e., how one manufacturer's choice of a certain contract type may affect its competitors' decisions.
Appendix A: Technical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1(i). The retailer's marginal profit with respect to Q is
for any Q > 0 because
Hence we need to have (1 − ψ)p − (w + c o ) > 0, or
to rule out the case where ∂π RS R (Q, Q e )/∂Q is negative for any Q > 0. Next we analyze the manufacturer's marginal profit with respect to Q e :
Therefore, the manufacturer will always choose Q e = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1(ii).
Since Q e = 0 for any ψ, it suffices to show that the retailer's order quantity Q decreases in ψ, which is true since ∂π
, we see that a higher ψ induces the retailer to choose a lower order quantity Q that deviates further from the first-best order quantity Q F B . Therefore, the revenue sharing contract is strictly dominated by the wholesale price contract, a degenerate revenue sharing contract with ψ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. In each of following two cases, we first derive and evaluate the manufacturer's marginal benefit from operating in the early production mode for an arbitrary combination of (Q, Q e ), and then apply the analysis to the case that Q = Q F B and Q e = Q F B e .
We have from (6), (7), and (9) that
If κ 1 ≥ κ 2 , then the second term in the right-hand side of (16) 
Therefore, any D-QF contract with κ 1 ≥ κ 2 cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, when we choose κ 2 > κ 1 , the second term in (16) is positive, meaning that the D-QF contract provides additional incentives for the manufacturer to operate in the early production mode. To coordinate the supply chain, (κ 1 , κ 2 ) must
e ), which can be reorganized as
We have from (6), (8), and (9) that
The first-order derivative of E[T d ] with respect to Q e is
Similar to Case (i), we need κ 2 > κ 1 so that the contract can provide adequate incentive for the manufacturer to operate in the early production mode. To coordinate the supply chain, it is necessary for (κ 1 , κ 2 ) to
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the BLR contract, the manufacturer's and the retailer's profit functions are, respectively, as follows: 
The procedure of deriving the optimal contract parameters consists of two steps. First, suppose that the retailer orders exactly Q F B , we choose the contract parameters to ensure that the manufacturer would respond by setting Q e = Q F B e . To implement the first-best solution, we need to make sure that the manufacturer's risk-benefit tradeoff is equivalent to that under the first-best scenario, that is,
where b and c e − βc r − ρwβ(1 − α) are the coefficients of E[Z(Q, Q e )] and Q e in (17), and p and c e − βc r are the coefficients of E[Z(Q, Q e )] and Q e in (4).
Second, we analyze the retailer's decision in the way similar to the first step. We obtain the following equation by comparing (18) and (4):
Equations (19) and (20) jointly give the coordinating contract parameters.
Remark:
The above proof relies on the comparison of cost and revenue parameters, and is independent of γ. Therefore, Proposition 3 holds even when γ is a function of the quantity of on-time delivered units.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under the QF contract, the manufacturer's objective function is π QF M (Q, Q e ) = (w − c r )Q − (c e − βc r )Q e − E[T c (Q, Q e )], where E[T c (Q, Q e )] is the expected transfer payment from the manufacturer to the retailer. Hence the marginal benefit of early production to the manufacturer is −∂E[T c (Q, Q e )]/∂Q e . In the first-best scenario, by comparison, the marginal benefit of early production is p∂E[Z(Q, Q e )]/∂Q e = p(1 − α)βγ · [F ((Q − γQ e )/(1 − γ)) − F (Q e )] .
Case (i). 0 ≤ κ < 1 − Q e /Q: The expected returning quantity E[R(Q, Q e )], from Table 4 , is It follows from (21) and (22) that the marginal benefit of early production to the manufacturer is strictly lower than that to the supply chain for any (Q, Q e ). Therefore, unless Q F B e = 0, the QF contract cannot provide the manufacturer with adequate incentive to operate in the early production mode even when the retailer chooses Q F B .
Cases (ii). 1 − Q e /Q ≤ κ < 1: Using a procedure similar to that in Case (i), we obtain −∂E[T c (Q, Q e )]/∂Q e = w(1 − α)βγ · [F ((Q − γQ e )/(1 − γ)) − F (Q e )] .
By comparing (21) and (23) = 0, the manufacturer is not provided with adequate incentive to operate in the early production mode even when the retailer chooses Q F B .
To summarize Cases (i) and (ii), the QF contract cannot coordinate the supply chain unless Q F B e = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. For the LR contract to coordinate the supply chain, we need two conditions.
First, the LR contract needs to eliminate the double marginalization, that is, w + c o − ρ LR w(1 − α) = c r + c o .
Second, the LR contract needs to offset the manufacturer's expected additional costs due to early production so that the manufacturer will be indifferent about the choice of Q e , that is, −(c e − βc r ) + ρ LR w(1 − α)β = 0.
These two equations jointly give the optimal contract parameters.
Remark: Similar to Proposition 3, Proposition 5 holds even when γ is a function of the quantity of on-time delivered units.
Appendix B: Analysis of Traditional Contracts
B.1. Wholesale Price Contract
We first consider the wholesale price contract. The manufacturer's profit is π W M (Q, Q e ) = wQ − c r E[Q r ] − c e Q e = (w − c r )Q − (c e − βc r )Q e , which gives ∂π W M (Q, Q e )/∂Q e = −(c e − βc r ) < 0. Hence the manufacturer has no incentive to operate in the early production mode and always chooses Q e = 0. The problem is hence reduced to the scenario where the manufacturer has a single production mode.
B.2. Buyback Contract
Under a buyback contract, the manufacturer pays the retailer b for each unit of unsold product. The manufacturer's total buyback cost is therefore b · {Q − E[Z(Q, Q e )]}. The manufacturer's expected profit under this contract is π B M (Q, Q e ) = (w − c r )Q − (c e − βc r )Q e − b · {Q − E[Z(Q, Q e )]}. In the first-best scenario, given Q F B , the manufacturer sets Q e that maximizes pE[Z(Q F B , Q e )] − (c e − βc r )Q e (cf. (4)), which differs from bE[Z(Q F B , Q e )] − (c e − βc r )Q e under the buyback contract. Since b < p, the manufacturer's marginal return from early production is strictly lower than in the first-best scenario. Therefore, the manufacturer sets Q e < Q F B e , meaning that the buyback contract is non-coordinating.
B.3. Quantity Discount Contract
Under a quantity discount contract, the retailer pays a lower wholesale price when the order quantity exceeds a certain threshold. We can show that, similar to the wholesale price contract, the quantity discount contract cannot motivate the manufacturer to operate in the early production mode, i.e., Q e = 0.
B.4. Sales Rebate Contract
Under a sales rebate contract, the manufacturer provides the retailer with a rebate when the sales exceeds a certain threshold. Similar to the wholesale price contract, the sales rebate contract will always lead to Q e = 0 because, while the sales rebate contract encourages the retailer to place a large order, it essentially gives the manufacturer a negative marginal benefit from engaging in early production.
Appendix C: Data Source
According to our communication with a production manager at a major vaccine manufacturer, the unit production costs for both early and regular production are roughly the same. We choose c r = c e = $3.0 to 
